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发表时间:2011-11-7 05:55

【原创】12省市GDP过万亿 关百姓鸟事[原创]



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【原创】12省市GDP过万亿 关百姓鸟事

全国29个省市区发布了前三季度经济运行情况。根据已公布的数据,12省份GDP总量已经超过万亿。从GDP增速来看,北京以8%的增速,在上半年垫底之后,继续维持最后一名。同时,经济发达地区的省份增速明显低于其他地区。(新京报11月6日)

前两天在《21世纪经济报道》看到“万亿GDP省份猛增:14省市进万亿俱乐部”新闻时只是浏览而过,心想官方的大数字又出炉了。没想到今天再次看到这样显著的标题新闻,耐着性子看完报道,即不知道这样的数字是如何统计出来的,更不知道官方发布这样数字的真实意图何在。但我想这样的数字应该适合决策者和领导看,关老百姓鸟事呢。

上世纪八十年代从洋人那里引进这么个数字以来,其实已越来越成为一个很糟糕的数字。仅仅是用来衡量一个国家或一个地方国民经济发展情况的一个指标,到了我们这里却逐渐发生异化,和地方官员的政绩和乌纱挂上了勾,成了他们追逐和攀比的标志。结果出现了资源浪费,生态环境恶化,经济比例失调,失业增加,贫富悬殊等一系列社会问题。

事实上,现在很多国家早已摒弃了这样的考核指标,因为单从这个数字反映不出民众的幸福感,很多国家已经用“国民幸福指标”取代了它,比如日本、不丹、英国等。而我们官方公布的数字往往和民众的感受是矛盾的。有这么多省市GDP过了万亿,是社会财富真的增加了还是民众的幸福感增强了?有调查说现在60%的民众有幸福感,但很快大多数人成了被幸福。

数字的好看其实说明不了什么,为了堆高这个数字,很多地方拆了建、建了拆,在这样重复建设中,GDP数字是增了,但却造成了社会财富的大量浪费,而中西部一些依赖资源的省份由于过度开采,在环境遭到了污染的同时还留下了诸多的隐患。

快至年末,公布这样的数字也许是提醒GDP增幅过快的省份节能减排任务的艰巨性,正如去年这个时候,一些地方为了完成任务不惜拉闸限电,引发民怨招来骂声。老百姓关注的不是这个数字的多少,也不是哪些省份增幅快哪些慢,而是这个数字到底让百姓的生活有没有好转,如果吃肉都成了奢望,如果连一口新鲜空气都呼吸不到,连一口干净的水都喝不上,如果工资还是那么低,房价依然那么高,工作还是那么难找,上学难看病难依然没有改善,那么这样的数字只能让人反感。

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隐身或者不在线

回复时间:2011-11-7 11:54
鲜葡萄可以卖钱 榨成汁可以卖钱 酿成酒可以卖钱 晒成干可以卖钱
那生出葡萄的枝条 只要用恶臭粪水、化学药品浇浇就成

隐身或者不在线

回复时间:2011-11-7 15:48
听听郎咸宁沈阳秘密讲话就是上述是假的。。

隐身或者不在线

回复时间:2011-11-7 15:50
关我鸟事




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百姓的工资和非洲接轨。领导的补贴和欧美接轨!
隐身或者不在线

回复时间:2011-11-7 19:44

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On Tuesday, the National Bureau of Statistics will release its estimate of China’s gross domestic product for the third quarter. Dow Jones’s MarketWatch reports that the consensus estimate is 9.2% growth. This means NBS, in all probability, will tell us that growth came in at 9.3%, maybe even 9.4%.

In any event, Tuesday’s official figure will show that the economy is slowing. Second-quarter growth was officially pegged at 9.5%, off from Q1’s 9.7%. This downward trend is generally seen as a positive sign, a signal that Beijing’s recent tightening efforts are working.

Chinese technocrats have been, in various ways, draining money from the economy to rein in inflation. On Friday, Beijing announced that the consumer price index rose 6.1% in September, down from the 6.2% increase in the previous month and a 6.5% jump in July.

So far, the official numbers point to a “soft landing” for the Chinese economy, which means growth around 8% and inflation about 5%. “China will not experience anything like the Asian financial crisis of 1997,” wrote Yiping Huang in the Wall Street Journal last week. Why not? The Barclays Capital economist points to the country’s “large” current account surplus, “gigantic” foreign exchange reserves, and its “undervalued” currency.

Huang assumes that Beijing can reverse course and pump money into the economy if needed. He asks this: “If conditions continue to deteriorate, does the government still have the resources to stimulate the economy and prevent a hard landing?”

Of course it does. Although its $3.2 trillion of foreign exchange reserves are of limited use in a local-currency crisis, Beijing can still print renminbi and take other steps to expand the money supply. But Huang asks the wrong question. The correct one is this: Can Beijing pump prime without aggravating existing economic problems?

Most analysts assume it can. Forbes contributor Kenneth Rapoza recently quoted Cong Li, chief investment officer in Hong Kong with Mirae Asset Global Investments, to the effect that Beijing still has the flexibility to reverse its tightening policies.

That conclusion is debatable for two principal reasons. First, if Beijing were to reverse its tightening policies, it would reignite inflation, which could be running twice the government’s numbers. The assumption in China-watching circles is that, as growth slows, inflation will cool as well. Growth has fallen precipitously in recent months and the economy may even be contracting, yet inflation has declined only marginally.

For instance, critically important food inflation—China’s poor spend almost half their disposable income on edibles—has remained high in recent months despite drastic government measures. It was 14.4% in June, 14.8% in July, and 13.4% in both August and September. Most forecasts indicate food prices will not decline much—if at all—through the end of the year.

Second, a loose policy would ultimately add to the woes of the state banks, which are already burdened by questionable loans after being forced to go on a multi-year lending spree to build the now-famous “ghost cities” and all the other unviable projects in the country. At the end of June, the People’s Bank of China said that the nonperforming loan ratio of China’s banks was about 1%, but nobody really believed that.

Investors, for one thing, were dubious. The stocks of Chinese banks fell this year and were trading at price-to-book ratios that assumed these institutions would suffer substantial losses on their loan portfolios. Beijing’s sovereign wealth fund had to launch a rescue last week by announcing open-market share purchases of Chinese banks.

The move triggered a short rally, but it did not solve the fundamental problem: Credit Suisse last week said that bad debt could be as much as 60% of bank equity. The 60% figure assumes that bad loans constitute only 12% of loan portfolios, but as in the bank crisis at the end of the 1990s, questionable assets are probably multiples of this figure.

The problem for Beijing is that this time, unlike the end of 2008, it has little flexibility to dump money in the economy to restart growth and save borrowers. It already did that and has, in addition to inflation, created historically high property prices, vacant apartment buildings, and debt-swollen local government financing vehicles. Yes, increasing liquidity would aid borrowers in the short-term, but that tactic would only make the debt bomb bigger.

Beijing could take foreign currency out of its reserves to recapitalize its largest banks—as it did in early 2004—but that just pushes the People’s Bank of China, the country’s central bank, deeper into insolvency. In any event, recapitalization would buy only a little time.

The Chinese central government has, in past crises, sustained the momentum of the economy by creating circular flows of cash, using money from one state institution to bail out other ones. Yet all artificial situations eventually end. State-dominated economies have more ability to postpone the inevitable, but the corrections they suffer are often worse as a result of continual deferrals.

Like 2008, the Chinese economy is now emitting strong signals it wants to correct. Last time, Beijing, flush with cash, chose to override the market and postpone the reckoning with its “tidal-wave” spending. Now, Chinese technocrats are almost out of options.

As a result, the downturn in China this time is probably the one history remembers.

上周二,国家统计局将发布第三季度中国的国内生产总值(GDP)的估计。道琼斯公司的市场报告,协商一致的估计是增长9.2%。在所有的可能性,这意味着国家统计局,会告诉我们,增长了9.3%,甚至9.4%。

在任何情况下,周二的官方数字表明,经济正在放缓。正式挂在第二季度增长9.5%,从第一季度的9.7%关闭。通常被看作是一个积极的迹象,北京最近的紧缩力度是工作的一个信号,这种下降趋势。

中国的技术已经以各种方式,排水钱从经济,遏制通货膨胀。上周五,北京宣布,居民消费价格指数上升6.1%,9月下降,比上月增长6.2%和,在7月的6.5%跳。

到目前为止,官方的数字,为中国经济的“软着陆”,这意味着约8%和5%左右的通胀的增长。在“华尔街日报”中写道:“像1997年的亚洲金融危机,中国将不会遇到任何,黄益平上周。为什么不呢?巴克莱资本经济学家点,以国家的“大”的经常帐盈余,“巨大”的外汇储备,其“低估”的货币。

黄假定,北京如果需要的话,可以扭转经济的过程中,泵钱。他问:“如果情况继续恶化,政府是否仍然有资源刺激经济,防止经济硬着陆?”

当然它。虽然美元的3.2万亿美元的外汇储备有限使用当地货币危机,北京仍然可以打印人民币,并采取其他措施,以扩大货币供应量。不过,黄问错了问题。正确的是:北京泵不加重现有的经济问题总理?

大多数分析家假设是可以的。福布斯贡献者午Rapoza最近引述,香港未来资产环球投资首席投资官,李聪,北京仍具有很大的灵活性,以扭转其紧缩政策的效果。

这个结论是值得商榷的两个主要的原因。首先,如果北京,扭转其紧缩政策,这将重燃通货膨胀,可以运行,政府的数字的两倍。假设中国看界,随着增长放缓,通货膨胀以及将冷却。增长在最近几个月急剧下降,经济甚至可能被承包,但通货膨胀仅略有下降。

举例来说,极为重要的食品通胀,中国的穷人花几乎一半的人均可支配收入仍然急剧政府采取措施,在最近几个月高零嘴。这是6月的14.4%,7月份的14.8%,并在八月和九月的13.4%。大多数预测显示,在所有通过今年年底,如果食品价格不会下降。

其次,宽松的政策将最终添加到国有银行的困境,这是已经可疑贷款的负担后,被迫去建立一个多年期的贷款狂潮现在著名的“幽灵城市”和所有其他不可行在国家项目。在六月底,中国人民银行表示,中国的银行不良贷款比率为1%左右,但没有人真正相信。

投资者的一件事,是可疑的。中国银行的股票下跌,今年和交易,在价格与帐面价值的比率,假设这些机构将蒙受其贷款组合的重大损失。北京的主权财富基金已启动救援上周公布的中国银行公开市场购买股票。

此举引发了短期反弹,但它并没有解决根本问题:瑞士信贷银行上周表示,坏帐可能高达60%的银行股权。 60%的数字假定不良贷款只占12%的贷款组合,但在20世纪90年代末的银行危机,可疑的资产可能是这个数字的倍数。

北京的问题是,这一次,不像2008年年底,它有弹性小转储在经济重新开始增长,并节省借款人的钱。它已经没有,除了通货膨胀,创造了历史高位的楼价,空置的公寓楼,和债务肿地方政府融资车辆。是,增加流动性将有助于在短期借款,但这种策略只会使债务炸弹做大。

北京可能采取外币储备资产重组其最大的银行,因为它没有2004年年初,但只是把中国的人民银行,国家的中央银行,进入破产更深。在任何情况下,资本重组,将购买时间只有一点点。

中国中央政府,在过去的危机,持续创造现金的循环流动,从一个国家机构使用金钱来挽救其他的经济势头。然而,所有人工的情况下最终结束。国家主导的经济体有更多的能力推迟不可避免的,但他们遭受的更正往往不断推迟的结果更糟糕。

像2008年,中国经济现在散发出强烈的信号,要纠正。最后时刻,北京,冲洗现金,选择覆盖市场,并推迟其“潮波”支出测算。现在,中国的技术几乎退出选项。

因此,在中国这段时间的低迷可能是一个历史的回忆。




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